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I NTRODUCTION

A law backfires when it produces results opposite from those its drafters
intended.1 Lots of laws may have backfired. For example, people opposed to
hate crimes legislation think that the laws "inflame prejudice rather than
2
eradicate it." The Endangered Species Act, according to some analysts, has
3
helped destroy rather than preserve the creatures listed by the Act. Even
*

Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1969, University of
Rochester; J.D. 1972, Cornell. -Ed. The author is Reporter for the American Law Institute's Prin
ciples of the Law of Software Contracts. Thanks to Doug Kysar for reading a draft, and to Adam
Smith, Cornell Law School class of 2007, for excellent research assistance.
I. See Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. R EV . 8 19 (2002)
(documenting and critiquing the frequent charge of backfire); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the
Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407 ( 1990) ("[Some] regulatory strategies . . . achieve an
end precisely opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that can be
brought forward in their support.").

2. Jeffery Rosen, Foreword, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324 ( 1999) (describing JAMES B.
JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLI TICS ( 1998)).
3.
Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species A ct: Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners,
24 ENVTL. L. 4 19, 424 ( 1994); John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under
the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 561 & n.220 ( 1994) (citing Robert J. Smith, The
Endangered Species A ct: Saving Species or Stopping Growth ?, CATO R EV. Bus. & Gov'T REG.,
Winter 1992, at 83, 85).
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consumer protection laws, some believe, increase prices and confuse con
sumers instead of protecting them.4
This Article analyzes whether mandatory website disclosure of e
standard terms, advocated by some as a potential solution to market failures
when consumers contract over the Internet, is another potential legal back
fire. By mandatory website disclosure, I do not mean a "clickwrap"
presentation of terms, in which a consumer must click "I agree" or the like
on a screen presenting the terms prior to the completion of a transaction in
5
progress. Mandatory website disclosure would require a business to main
tain an Internet presence and to post its terms prior to any particular
transaction so that a consumer could read and compare terms without mak
ing a purchase at all.
The problem is not that mandatory website disclosure would increase
the cost of doing business, which would be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices. Businesses have been unable to demonstrate that dis
6
playing their terms on their websites would be costly. Nor should drafting
7
rules that implement the law be too difficult. Businesses could be required
to display their terms on their homepage or on another page reachable di-

4.

See Hillman, supra note 1, at 819-20. Here are some more examples of possible legal

backfires:
The Environmental Protection Agency's actions to regulate coal-burning power plants is "so
inept that some of the nation's most populous areas will end up with a worse environment than
would have resulted if the new policy had never been put into effect." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T.HASSLER, CLEAN CoALIDJRTY AIR 2 (1981).... The Highway Beautification Act
"thwarts highway beautification." Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 467
(2000)....Trial judges' admonitions to juries to disregard tainted evidence causes them to fo
cus on that evidence.Regina Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay, 19 LAW & HuM.BEHAV.
345, 349 (1995).... Boot camps for juvenile offenders, which mimic aspects of military basic
training in lieu of incarceration, result in greater instead of lesser recidivism.Jayson Blair, Ide
als & Trends; Boot Camps: An Idea Whose Time Came and Went, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000,
§ 4, at 3. Flexible spending accounts, instead of "hold[ing] down medical costs ...encourage[]
extra medical spending." David E. Rosenbaum, When Laws Shoot Themselves in the Foot,
N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, § 4, at 2.... Remarkably, even the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit is
not sacrosanct. A joint study by the Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway
Administration reported that lowering speed limits increased the number of accidents. Effects
of Raising and Lowering Speed Limits, Report No. FHW A-RD-92-084 (U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
Fed. Highway Admin., 1992), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel/index.htrnl, dis
cussed in Eric Peters, Demise of 'Double Nickel' Speed Limit Sought, WASH. TIMES, Sept. l5,
1995, at E13. The Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine decreased instead
of increased the broadcasting of diverse viewpoints.... The fuel economy standards imposed
on automobile manufacturers increased rather than decreased our dependence on foreign oil.

Id. at 820-21 n.5.
5.
See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 464 (2002). In contrast, in a "browsewrap" transaction, a
consumer who is downloading software or purchasing goods electronically views a screen that
refers to terms that can be found elsewhere. Browsewrap, therefore, permits consumers to bypass
the standard form and to "agree" to the terms without ever seeing them.See

id.

See Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case
Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753,
6.

768 ("Advance disclosure in the age of computers and the Internet is simple and cheaper than print
ing copies and getting them into boxes.").

7.

See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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rectly through a clearly identified hyperlink. Further, businesses could be
required to prove the availability of their terms by furnishing relatively in
expensive archival records of their websites. Mandatory website disclosure
may backfire, however, because it may not increase reading or shopping for
terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead, may
8
make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable.

Part I reviews why market forces may fail adequately to police standard
forms on the Internet. It summarizes previous work in which I report that,
despite the relative luxury of time and the lack of sales pressure, consumers
generally do not read their e-standard forms presented during a transaction
9
beyond price and the description of the goods and rarely shop for terms. As
a result, market pressure may be insufficient to deter some businesses from
overreaching.

Part II shows that mandatory website disclosure as a remedy for market
failure is worthy of a focused analysis because its surface attractiveness
means that lawmakers are likely to adopt it. Mandatory website disclosure is
appealing because, in theory, it would increase the numbers of readers of
and shoppers for standard terms, who would have time to contemplate and
compare terms, or, at least, it would increase the opportunity to read and
shop for terms. Further, mandatory website disclosure would help motivate
businesses to write fair terms in order to avoid losing customers to competi
tors with better terms or to avoid adverse publicity from watchdog groups
that can monitor websites and spread the word about unreasonable terms
quickly and easily over the Internet. Mandatory website disclosure, there
fore, arguably would promote reasonable terms, decrease the instances of
market failure, and legitimize the idea that e-purchasers have assented, at
0
least impliedly, to the terms.1 Further, mandatory website disclosure would
not be too expensive or administratively infeasible.11

Part III addresses whether mandatory website disclosure can succeed.
Despite its appeal, I worry that it may not achieve its objectives, or worse,
may backfire. My preliminary empirical work on e-consumer reading of
standard forms, as well as studies of e-shopping behavior, suggests that ad
vance disclosure of terms likely will fail to increase reading or shopping for
2
terms.1 This should be no surprise. Despite the opportunity to read, most

8.

See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.

9. See generally Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5; Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Con
sumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in Is
CONSUMER PROTECTION AN ANACHRONISM IN THE INFORMATION EcONOMY? (forthcoming 2006).
1 0.
Braucher, supra note 6, at 768 ("To force advance disclosure that facilitates shopping and
thus market policing, courts should find no agreement to mass-market terms not publicly available
before a customer initiates an order.").
11.

See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

12. My survey results show that only four percent of purchasers generally read their e
purchase contracts beyond price and product description. See Hillman, supra note 9; see also Clay
ton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 687-88 (2004) ("It
is unlikely that the Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more
traditional buyers devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms].").
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e-consumers may still have ample rational reasons for not reading and cog
3
nitive processes that deter reading and processing terms. 1 In addition, e
consumers, drawn to the speed and novelty of the Internet, are unlikely to
have the patience or discipline to compare terms regardless of when the
terms become available. Further, watchdog groups may not positively moti
vate businesses because they may lack influence and because businesses
may conclude that the benefits of particular terms outweigh any potential
costs in adverse publicity.
In light of the potential failure of mandatory website disclosure to in
crease reading and to discipline businesses, the only effects of the proposal
may be to insulate businesses from claims of procedural unconscionability
and to create a safe harbor for businesses to draft suspect terms. My goal is
not to claim that mandatory website disclosure will certainly backfire so that
the proposal should be taken off the table. In fact, I conclude that mandatory
website disclosure ultimately may be the most viable alternative. I simply
want to elaborate on the reasons that the possibility of backfire should be
taken seriously before moving in the direction of mandatory website disclo
sure.
I . THE E -STANDARD-FORM ENVIRONMENT
A. Do Consumers Read Their £-Standard Fonns?
Professor Rachlinski and I maintained that the e-standard-form environment presented consumers with several advantages:
Several factors suggest that consumers can defend themselves against un
desirable terms more easily in the electronic environment. E-consumers
can shop in the privacy of their own homes, where they can make careful
decisions with fewer time constraints. They can leave their computers and
return before completing their transactions, giving them time to think and
investigate further. Also, at present, e-consumers tend to be better educated
and wealthier than paper-world consumers, suggesting that they can better
fend for themselves in the marketplace.
The Internet has also taken comparison shopping to a level that is unimag
inable in the real world. The ease with which consumers can compare
business practices, including the content of standard forms, suggests that
consumers do not need judicial intervention to protect themselves from

business abuse. 14

Notwithstanding these benefits, we saw several pitfalls for consumers in
the e-world, consisting of either rational, cognitive, or social reasons for
failing to read terms or to consider them in their decisions. Some of the ra
tional reasons coincide with paper-world barriers to reading, such as

13.
Even consumers who read their terms do not necessarily account for them in their deci
sionmaking. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L . REv. 1203 (2003).
14.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 478 (footnotes omitted).
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boilerplate's lack of lucidity, consumers' lack of bargaining power and
5
choices, and the relative likelihood that nothing will go wrong. 1 In addition,
the e-environment adds to the futility of reading because of the lack of a live
contracting partner and the time and effort necessary to locate terms that e
6
businesses can easily hide. 1 In short, e-consumers may rationally compare
the costs and benefits of reading terms and find a net benefit in spending
their time on another activity.
Cognitive reasons for failing to read and process terms also coincide
with those in the paper world. These include consumers' propensity to
equate "low probability" risks with "zero probability" risks, 17 and their ten
dencies to digest a limited quantity of information and to rely instead on
8
hunches and processes that simplify decisionmaking. 1 For these reasons,
terms that apply when things go wrong, such as dispute resolution and fo

rum selection, especially may not be salient to consumers. 19

On the surface, the e-environment appears to favor e-consumers by
eliminating social pressures such as hovering sales agents and impatient
2
people in line. 0 However, Rachlin ski and I pointed out that the e
environment substitutes other hurdles to reading and processing terms. E
consumers may not attach appropriate significance to a mouse click and
2
therefore may fail to appreciate the seriousness of their actions. 1 Further,
computers and the Internet appear to cast a spell over many consumers,
22
making them impatient, even impetuous. We used the term "click-happy"
to describe the activity of many consumers contemplating e-standard
2
forms. 3
In light of these factors, Rachlinski and I predicted that e-consumers
were just as unlikely to read and shop for standard terms as their paper
world counterparts, who, by and large, ignore their standard forms and fail
24
to shop for favorable terms.
Preliminary empirical evidence from my
forthcoming

survey

1 5.

Id. at 446-47.

1 6.

ld. at 479-80.

of ninety-two

contracts

students

bears

out

this

Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
17.
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L . REV. 700, 720 ( 1992).
18.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 452-53.

19.

Hillman, supra note 9, at 12 tbl.5C.

20.

See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 480.

2 1 . Id. at 481; see also Anonymous Posting to ContractsProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2005/04/paper_not_plast.html (Apr. 27, 2005) ("The 'cautionary'
functions of a contract are easier to achieve through the formalities of a written document . . . ."
(relying on a report in BNA's Electronic Commerce and Law journal)).
22.

See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.

23.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 479-80.

24. Id. at 485. Few empirical studies examine consumer reading of standard forms in the
paper world. Most commentators merely cite or quote Todd Rakoff's piece on contracts of adhesion
for the proposition that consumers do not read standard forms. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1 173, 1 179 (I 983); see also Korobkin,
supra note 13, at 1217 n.45.
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25
prediction. Beyond price and product description, only four percent of the
2
sample read their e-purchase contracts "as a general matter.'' 6 Further, forty
four percent of the respondents reported affirmatively that, other than price
and product description, they do not read their e-purchase contracts under
27
any circumstances. One-third of the respondents may be spurred on to read
when the value of the contract is high, and one-third may read when the
2
vendor is unknown. 8 About seventeen percent read some selected terms,
2
mainly warranties, product information, disclosures, and warnings. 9
Impatience accounts most often for the failure of respondents to read their
Jo
forms, reinforcing the image of the "click-happy" consumer. Finally, only
seven percent of respondents shop for advantageous terms (beyond price
and description of the goods) despite the advantage of shopping on the
J
Intemet. 1
B. Can Market Pressure Discipline £-Businesses?
Despite the apparent failure of most e-consumers to read their standard
forms and to shop for terms, standard-form contracting is good for busi
nesses and consumers alike, provided that market or other forces deter
businesses from overreaching. The pros and cons of standard forms are
J2
well-known. The bottom line is that standard forms reduce the cost of do
ing business because the drafter, familiar with its products and services, can
best determine the risks it can efficiently bear and the risks better allocated
JJ
to the consumer. Further, businesses that use standard forms do not have to
bear the cost of bargaining over terms. Drafters can reduce prices because of
.
J
these savmgs. 4

25. Hillman, supra note 9. The survey inquired, among other things, about the frequency of
electronic contracting, the subject matter (purchases or subscriptions), the place and time of making
such contracts, the extent to which participants read forms, the particular terms read, the reasons for
not reading, and conditions and mechanisms that would promote reading. The survey also compared
the practices of men and women and of frequent and occasional users.
Respondents could select more than one response to many of the questions discussed infra in text accompanying footnotes 26-31.
26.

Id. at 7.

27.

Id. at 8.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Sixty-five percent of the respondents failed to read for this reason. Id. at IO.

3 1. Id. at 13. PC Pitstop's licensing agreement promised a "consideration" to anyone who
read their terms and sent an email to an address listed in the agreement. It took four months and
more than 3000 downloads before anyone wrote the email. Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License
Agreements, PC PITS TOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
My colleague Doug Kysar points out that PC Pitstop is a free site and people are therefore unlikely
to read the terms of use.
32.

See, e.g. , Rakoff, supra note 24.

33.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 437-39.

34.

See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 7 1 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002).
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Many scholars, Rachlinksi and I included, have discussed whether mar
5
ket forces discipline the drafters of standard forms.3 Notwithstanding the
common failure of most consumers to read standard forms, analysts have
suggested that in competitive markets a small number of readers, whom
businesses cannot afford to lose, may be sufficient to deter overreaching.36
Competition for market share in the e-environment may therefore deter
businesses from drafting onerous terms or even motivate them to write terms
3
favorable to consumers. 7 Because e-consumers can easily spread the word
3
about the nature of the terms, the Internet should increase this incentive. 8
39
However, market pressure may be insufficient to discipline businesses.
In insufficiently competitive industries, businesses can afford to lose the
°
small cadre of readers and dictate onerous terms to the nonreaders.4 Further,
in more competitive climates, businesses may be able to identify readers and
offer them more favorable terms. E-technology facilitates such segregation
by enabling businesses to gather data on consumer behavior on the Inter
net.41
In addition, e-commerce offers businesses new and inexpensive strate
gies for manipulating consumers to minimize standard-term shopping. As
Rachlinski and I pointed out, businesses can experiment with modes of
presentation, including methods of accessing the standard terms, graphics,

35.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5; see also Korobkin, supra note 13.

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Con
tract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1409 (1983).
36.

37. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 469-70. Akerlof's "lemons model" explains
that businesses will write only average quality terms if their customers are not aware of better terms
and therefore will not pay more for them. See Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS AND THE LAW 502, 504 (Peter Newman ed., Stockton
Press 1998) ("The lemons model applies quite straightforwardly to the case of form contracts, since
such contracts vary substantially in their terms and the drafting party . . . knows much more about
those terms than the nondrafting party." (discussing George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970))).
38.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 470; Katz, supra note 37, at 505 ("If reputational
concerns lead drafters of forms to moderate their opportunism, regulation may be largely unneces
sary.").
39.
There is ample evidence that some businesses seek to take advantage of consumers. See,
e.g., Jeff Sovern, Towards a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transac
tions Costs, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2006) (marshaling evidence of businesses'
strategies to increase consumer transaction costs, such as by utilizing rebates). Businesses that seek
to defraud customers are beyond the scope of this Article.
40.

Gillette, supra note 12, at 695.

41. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 471-72; see also Donnavieve N. Smith & K.
Sivakumar, Flow and Internet Shopping Behavior: A Conceptual Model and Research Propositions,
57 J. Bus. RES. 1199, 1207 (2004) ("To ensure the desired shopping behavior, e-tailers should at
tempt to manage the shoppers' flow states on an individual basis. They should invest in tools that
enable them to develop personal profiles of their customers, while garnering information regarding
the consumers' skills and their perceptions of the challenges presented by shopping the site."). Seg
regation of readers will work, of course, only if watchdog groups are ineffectual. See infra notes 4850, 91-92 and accompanying text.
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and font sizes, to determine which presentations most effectively deter read
42
ing, and can use those strategies when the consumer decides to contract.
In the article reporting my survey, I evaluated various proposals for in
tervention in the e-market on the assumption that market failures exist and
43
that the benefits of regulation exceed its costs. The proposals include en
forcing clickwrap but not browsewrap contracts, adopting more specific
rules about presentation and agreement to terms, requiring a cooling-off
44
period, and adopting substantive mandatory terms. Suffice it to say here
that enforcing only clickwrap terms may not be enough because, for the
reasons already mentioned, consumers are unlikely to read and digest the
terms presented on a screen during a transaction. Further, other methods of
attracting attention to the terms, such as requiring bold text or clicking after
each term on the screen (or both), might increase reading, but analogous
strategies in the paper world have had mixed results, probably in part be
cause consumers, worn down by the contracting process, are unlikely to be
45
riveted to attention by such formalities. In addition, contracting could be
come prohibitively expensive for e-businesses if consumers could retract
their consent during a cooling-off period, and for little gain because con
46
sumers are as unlikely to read terms after a transaction as during one.

42.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 479. Rachlinski and I also noted:

Studies of e-commerce confirm the suspicion that the Internet is not yet a consumer's paradise.
In theory, the easy access to information that the Internet provides should reduce prices and
reduce price dispersion between businesses that supply similar goods. Although e-commerce
has had this effect on some commodities, wide dispersions in prices can be found. In some
cases, the disparities are no lower on the Internet than in the real world. These results indicate
that e-consumers have yet to exploit the full benefits of the electronic environment. Despite the
Internet's apparent benefits for consumers, these findings reveal that businesses still have
many opportunities to exploit consumers' lack of information about goods and services.
Id. at 473-74 (footnotes omitted).
43.

Hillman, supra note 9.

44. See id. For the definitions of clickwrap and browsewrap, see supra note 5 and accompa
nying text.
45. See Korobkin, supra note 13, at 1234 ("'Notice' is a prerequisite of salience, but notice
is not a sufficient condition of salience."); see also David Frisch & John D. Wladis, General Provi
sions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 46 Bus. LAW. 1455, 1495-96 (1991)
(discussing courts' varying requirements regarding "conspicuousness" in disclaimers of implied
warranties under the UCC). My survey of contracts students' e-standard-form practices revealed that
the respondents were more likely to read if they were required to click "I agree" at the end of each
term (49% or 45/92). Forty-two percent (39/92) of respondents also thought that they would read
bold or otherwise highlighted text. Only 24% (22/92) thought they would read terms presented in a
pop-up window and 23% (21/92) thought they would read when the terms appear on the screen as a
series of individual windows that must be clicked. Clicking "I agree" at the end of all of the terms
would induce reading among only 17% of the respondents (16/92). Perhaps the most significant
finding is that only 5% (5/92) of the respondents are more likely to read when they "must click" on
a link to another page to read the terms. This "browsewrap" strategy, however, is heavily utilized by
online merchants.
Respondents could select more than one response to the questions discussed here.
46.
CJ Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UC/TA Mass-Market Concept and Its Les
sons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 393, 404 (2003);
Korobkin, supra note 13, at 1265. For example, consumers might not remove already-downloaded
software from their computers.
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Finally, prescribing mandatory terms that extend regulation beyond the
tested limits of unconscionability and related litmus tests of reasonable con
tracting, such as the doctrines of duress and misrepresentation, runs into
serious autonomy objections and a legitimate concern over whether third
party regulators can effectively identify the class of terms that are the prod
uct of market failures.
Perhaps the most practical and promising suggestion is to require pre
contract mandatory website disclosure of terms. The next two Parts of this
Article analyze this proposal in depth.
II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MA NDATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE
To assess whether the law should require businesses to make their stan
dard forms available on their websites so that consumers can peruse them
even before deciding to make a purchase, lawmakers should assess the costs
and benefits of doing so. This Part shows that a very promising theoretical
case for mandatory website disclosure can be made. Nonetheless, in Part III,
I confess to serious reservations about whether mandatory website disclo
sure can be successful.
In theory, mandatory website disclosure would increase the number of
readers of standard forms and shoppers for terms to a level that businesses
could not ignore. Further, mandatory website disclosure would allow con
sumers to educate themselves by perusing and comparing terms far removed
from the excitement and anticipation of an imminent purchase. Businesses
in competitive markets would vie for a larger market share by writing terms
attractive to consumers. Market segregation of readers would be unsuccess
ful because of the volume of readers. Businesses in less competitive
industries would seek to draft attractive terms to appeal to the high volume

Liberal return policies among retailers in analogous shrinkwrap transactions constitute an ex
tralegal cooling-off period that seems to work, but return policies vary. See, e.g. , Deborah Tussey,
UCITA, Copyright, and Capture, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 319, 329 n.51 (2003) ("Any con
sumer could have [reported] that software retailers refuse to accept returns of opened software
packages."); Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 1449, 1475 n.92
(2004) ("A class action suit has been filed against Microsoft and various retailers claiming a con
spiracy to defraud the public on the grounds that the retailers have refused to accept return of
opened software packages by customers who refuse to accept the license terms." (citing Complaint
for Consumer Damages, Rescission and Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices, Baker v. Micro
soft, Inc., Civil Action No. 030612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 7, 2003))). The amended complaint in
Baker claims that if a consumer does not accept Microsoft's end user license agreement ("EULA"),
the retailer typically will not give the consumer a refund. See First Amended Complaint for Con
sumer Damages, Rescission and Relief from Unlawful, Unfair and Fraudulent Business Practices,
Baker v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 030612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May I, 2003), available at
http://www.techfirm.com/AmendedComplaint-Filed.pdf. Microsoft's website offers, with some
exceptions, a thirty-day return policy for all retail software products. The consumer is informed that
"[r]etail products can most easily be returned through the retailer where the product was purchased,
subject to that retailer's return policy, or directly to Microsoft, subject to the policy below." Micro
soft North American Retail Product Returns, http://www. microsoft.com/info/ nareturns.htm (last
visited June 21, 2005).
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of readers as well. Consumers could shop in these markets with some confi
47
dence that prices adequately reflect the quality of the terms.
Even if mandatory website disclosure did not increase consumer reading
very much, in theory it still might motivate businesses to write fair terms.
Businesses would worry, for example, that disclosure would facilitate watch
dog-group exposure of unsavory terms. Such exposure could ruin a business's
reputation, which is especially critical on the web where consumer trust is the
4
4
key to success, 8 and thereby diminish the business's market share. 9 For ex
ample, the Electronic Frontier Foundation lists "dangerous terms" on its
website, such as those that bar criticism of products, permit monitoring of a
transferee's computer, or allow modification of agreements without notice
5
or consent. 0
By increasing the opportunity to read e-standard forms, contract law
51
would also reinforce autonomy reasons for enforcing contracts. Consumers
who have an opportunity to read and compare terms can better choose for
themselves whether and with whom to contract. Mandatory website disclo
sure would

therefore reinforce Llewellyn's conception of consumers'
52
blanket assent to reasonable standard terms. Llewellyn wrote that, so long
as a consumer has access to standard terms, her signature constitutes an im
plied delegation to the drafter of the duty to draft fair and efficient
5
boilerplate terms, even if the consumer does not read them. 3 The delegation
is not unlike a consumer's delegation to a seller of the duty to select the
5
component parts of goods. 4 Under Llewellyn's theory, consumers who
agree to a standard-form transaction after mandatory website disclosure
55
would have a more difficult time complaining of hollow assent. The end

47.

See generally Christian J. Meier-Schatz, A Fresh Look at Business Disclosure, 51 AM. J.

COMP. L. 691 (2003) (book review).

48.
See, e.g., Efthymios Constantinides, Influencing the Online Consumer's Behavior: The
Web Experience, 14 INTERNET RES. 111, 118 (2004) ("The physical distance, lack of personal con
tact and the anonymity of the Internet . . . increas[e] the consumers' anxiety and risk perceptions.").
49. For a more sobering discussion of watchdog groups and their effect, see infra notes 9192 and accompanying text.
50.

See Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User's Guide

to

EUIAs, Et.EC. FRONTIER

FOUND., http://www.eff.org/wp/eula.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).

51. See John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REv. 237, 237 (1942) ("We
have been proud of our 'freedom of contract,' confident that the maximum of social progress will
result from encouragement of each man's initiative and ambition by giving him the right to use his
economic powers to the full.").
52. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 492 ("If e-consumers have some opportunity
to read the standard terms before deciding whether to enter into the contract, then courts should
apply Llewellyn's presumption of enforceability of such terms. Just as in the paper world, consum
ers understand the existence of standard terms and agree to be bound by them, even though they
rarely choose to read them." (footnote omitted)).
53.

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 (1960).

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 461--62; Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 308 & n.63 (1998-99).
54.

55.
Other factors, such as a lack of alternative terms, still may make a consumer's assent
rather artificial, of course.
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result would be that freedom of contract would have some meaning within
56

the realm of e-standard-form transactions.

Relatedly, even if disclosure fails to increase reading, it still may have
symbolic value by demonstrating lawmakers' efforts to make business
5
consumer transactions fairer. 7 Disclosure would show that lawmakers are
not content treating consumer assent to standard forms as what Lon Fuller
5
called an "apologetic or merciful [legal] fiction[]." 8 Fuller thought that the
presumption that "everyone knows the law," for example, is a useful fiction
to "apologize" for the troubling reality that people who are punished often
5
do not even realize that they are breaking the law. 9 Disclosure laws in the
context of e-standard-form contracts would mean that lawmakers were mak
ing an effort to tum into something more meaningful the "apologetic" legal
fiction that consumers understand and assent to the terms of their e
standard-form contracts.
Finally, mandatory website disclosure would eliminate painful deci
sions, like drawing lines between those consumer nonreaders who are
entitled to relief from standard terms and those who should be subject to the
6
duty to read. 0 After all, consumers bring a whole range of emotions, atti
6
tudes, and resources to their shopping experience. 1 The law cannot easily
sort out those Internet shoppers who should fend for themselves from those
who, because of emotional or cognitive processes, may have failed to inter
62
nalize adverse terms.
56. See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 723, 750. Of
course, consumers may have limited choices because of the commonality of terms within an indus
try. Common terms do not necessarily indicate collusion among businesses, however. Instead it may
mean that the terms are efficient. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 439 ("Because the best
allocation of risks is not likely to vary between businesses within an industry, most businesses will
offer terms similar to those offered by their competitors. Less experienced businesses simply copy
their senior counterparts. Uniformity of terms within an industry, in fact, might indicate that the
industry is highly competitive." (footnote omitted)).
57.
See William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transac
tions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 404 ("Perhaps we would have a more just society if relations between
consumer and merchant appeared more honest, even if there is no change in consumer behavior or
the content of transactions."); see also L.B. Edelman & M. Galanter, Law: Overview, 12 INTERNA
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 8537, 8539 (Neil J. Smelser &
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) ("Law operates not simply as a body of regulatory controls and public
edicts, but also as a set of symbols, with different meanings for different social groups.").
58.

LON

L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 84 (1967).

Id. (quoting PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY JN THE DEVELOPMENT OF L AW 386
(Martha M. Read trans., 1922) (omission in original)):
59.

It is an essentially human tendency to refuse to believe sad events and to invent happy ones.
What the lawmaker sometimes tries to do is precisely this-to efface unfortunate realities as far
as possible and to evoke the shades of fortunate realities which have not been achieved . . .
While the fiction is a subtle instrument of juridical technique, it is also clearly the expression
of a desire inherent in human nature, the desire to efface unpleasant realities and evoke imagi
nary good fortune.
60.

MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 163 (1993).

61.

See infra notes 62, 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion.

According to one study, e-shoppers may be confident or apprehensive, and highly in
62.
volved or apathetic. Letecia N. McKinney, Internet Shopping Orientation Segments: An Exploration
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The obvious costs of mandatory website disclosure should not be too
high because displaying standard forms on a website should be inexpensive.
In fact, to date, businesses have failed to mount an effective argument
3
against the requirement.6 Nor should lawmakers have insurmountable prob
lems drafting rules that successfully implement disclosure. The rules of
mandatory website disclosure must be clear and detailed if e-businesses are
64
to be discouraged from devising methods of deterring reading. Easily ac
cessible terms written in plain English on a website's homepage or on a
clearly identified hyperlink may add to the phalanx of readers, but legalese
65
that can be reached only after several mouse clicks likely would not. Man
datory website disclosure rules must therefore account for such strategies by
requiring businesses to display terms on their homepages or on another page
only a few clicks away. Further, the rules should bar scroll-down windows
66
that disappear or are too small.
Enforcement costs would include the cost of proving that a business
failed to display its terms prior to the transaction in a manner prescribed by
the law or at all. Mandatory website disclosure rules could allocate the bur
den of proof to businesses to prove the content of their websites, which
would motivate them to keep accurate evidence of the content. Many e
businesses currently keep archival records of their website content, includ
ing when it was introduced, modified, and removed. They also maintain
server logs, which indicate when and if a web page was modified. Under a
regime of mandatory website disclosure, all e-businesses would have to fol
low suit. Of course, businesses willing to engage in fraud may be able to
alter their records, but this problem should not be too different from the
challenge of weeding out fraud in the paper contracting world. Evidence to
corroborate a business's proof could include, for example, the testimony of
other visitors to the website during the contested period. E-businesses can
find these visitors by consulting their web logs. In the e-world, we can also

of Difef rences in Consumer Behavior, 32 FAM. & CONSUMER Sci. RES. J. 408, 418-421 (2004).
Such attitudes may have a significant effect on reading habits, as well as purchasing frequency.
Requiring courts to sort out which attitudes should lead them to discount the duty to read seems
unmanageable.
63. Braucher, supra note 6, at 768. Few software vendors currently display their terms on
their website. See Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer £-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1806-07 (2000) [hereinafter Braucher, Delayed Dis
closure] (reporting the author's finding that 87 .5% of software companies did not make precontract
disclosures of their terms).
64.

See Braucher, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 63, at 1807-08.

65. "There are design prescriptions gleaned from empirical studies of web-searching behav
ior that claim that if in three clicks users do not find information that at least suggests they are on
the right track, they will leave the site." Gary M. Olson & Judith S. Olson, Human-Computer Inter
action: Psychological Aspects of the Human Use of Computing, 54 ANN. REV. PsYCHOL. 491, 500
(2003). The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules of website disclosure. Federal Trade
Commission, Dot Com Disclosures, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/
index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). For a discussion, see Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap
Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 Bus LAW. 279, 302
(2003).
.

66.

See Kunz et al., supra note 65, at 302.
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expect rapid technological advances combined with entrepreneurial activity
to produce new methods of establishing credible evidence of website con
tent over time. For example, if contract law adopts mandatory website
disclosure, do not be surprised to see new web businesses spring up to ar
67
chive the standard forms of e-businesses.
III. WILL MAND ATORY WEBSITE DISCLOSURE B ACKFIRE?
A. Will Mandatory Website Disclosure
Alleviate Market Failures?
Mandatory website disclosure targets businesses by enforcing only those
terms that appear on a business's website prior to a transaction. Such a rule,
of course, does not mandate the content of terms. Disclosure is intended to
influence businesses to write reasonable terms on the theory that more con
sumers will read and shop for terms or that watchdog groups will publicize
adverse terms.
The problem is that people do not always act the way lawmakers predict,
and therefore, laws designed to achieve purposes by influencing people's
68
conduct can go astray, or even backfire. For example, the Endangered Spe
cies Act, mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, may threaten the
creatures it was designed to protect because lawmakers failed to predict that
landowners would lawfully destroy potential habitats so that listed species
69
would not occupy them. Hate crimes laws may decrease social harmony by
focusing people's attention on "conflict between races, genders, and nation
ality groups"70 and by creating the perception that such crimes occur more
7
frequently than they do in reality. 1 Will mandatory website disclosure also
backfire?

1. Disclosure as a Method of Increasing Reading
To make a long story short, mandatory website disclosure may fail to in
crease reading and shopping for terms. This is not a revelation, of course.
Many commentators seem to have lost faith in disclosure as a remedy for

market failures in standard-form contracting partly because they have seen

67.
For a discussion of current web archiving activity in the context of a recent lawsuit, see
Tom Zeller, Jr., Keeper of Expired Web Pages ls Sued Because Archive Was Used in Another Suit,
N.Y. TIM ES , July 13, 2005, at C9 ("The Internet Archive was created in 1996 as the institutional
memory of the online world, storing snapshots of ever-changing Web sites and collecting other
multimedia artifacts. . . . The Internet Archive uses Web-crawling 'bot' programs to make copies of
publicly accessible sites on a periodic, automated basis. Those copies are then stored on the ar
chive's servers for later recall using the Wayback machine.").

68.

Hillman, supra note I, at 846-47.

69. Gidari, supra note 3, at 424 ("Because of the habitat modification restrictions . . . land
owners are taking pains to manage their lands so that protected, or potentially protectable, species
do not occupy the site. ").
70.

JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 2, at 5.

71.

Id. at 132.
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72

and partly because

they now better understand the reasons people sometimes fail to respond to
73
information. Considerable evidence points to the failure of mandatory
74
website disclosure too.
Mandatory website disclosure may not increase reading and shopping
because most of the rational, cognitive, and emotional reasons consumers do
not read terms still apply regardless of when businesses display the terms.
Businesses can still hide behind legalese and consumers, who do not have
bargaining power, will continue to process information selectively and to
75
believe that nothing will go wrong. In fact, by increasing the information
available to consumers, the early display of terms may add to the problem of
76
Further, without the immediacy of an actual transac

information overload.

tion, consumers may find plowing through legalese more tedious and
worthless than ever.
Perhaps most important, if consumers are truly "click happy," they are
unlikely to settle down simply because of advance disclosure of terms.
72.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000) ; see Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 233, 261 (2002) ("Consumer disclosures retain their
appeal for lawmakers despite the growing realization that they do not work. Existing disclosure
forms, meant to remedy the incomprehensibility of consumer transactions, are viewed widely as
inadequate to the task."); Whitford, supra note 57, at 420 ("[T]he evidence presently available sug
gests that any success truth-in-lending will have inducing credit shopping for lower interest rates
will be modest and concentrated among higher income groups."); id. at 403 ("The continued reli
ance on disclosure as an important technique for regulating consumer transactions is contrary to the
advice of many commentators, who have argued that although not positively harmful, such regula
tion is typically almost useless.").
Some commentators see a value in disclosure laws such as Truth in Lending. See, e.g. , Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric
Paternalism '', 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1233 (2003) ("The Act provides potentially substantial
benefits to those who are less than rational . . . ."); Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding,
and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 807, 815 (2003) ("With aggressive and practical reform, Truth in Lending may blossom into a
much more effective strategy . . . .").
73. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309-10 ( 1986)
(discussing information overload); Korobkin, supra note 13. Disclosure may be ineffective, of
course, in many different contexts. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Din on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (arguing that disclo
sure may have a perverse effect in the context of conflict of interests).
74.
Some analysts are not optimistic that mandatory website disclosure of terms will in
crease reading of standard forms. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note I 2, at 687-88 ("It is unlikely that the
Internet buyer will devote more time to reading text on the website than more traditional buyers
devote to reviewing the terms of tangible [standard forms].").
75.

Hillman, supra note 34, at 757 & n.79.

76. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Needfor Mortgage
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1133 ( 1984) ("Consumers have a limited ability to absorb and
process information during any given period. If they receive too much, they either will be unable to
make accurate comparisons or will be discouraged from even trying to evaluate the data."); Jeff
Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty
Advocates, law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 Wis.
L. REv. 13, 28-29 ("Though some research indicates the contrary, a number of studies show that
people make less effective decisions when overloaded with information; that is, they select a less
than optimal choice." (footnote omitted)); Eduardo Porter, Choice is Good. Yes, No or Maybe ?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, § 4, at 12 (''Too many options may drive consumers away.").
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Understanding people's Internet shopping processes adds to the pessimism.
Analysis of such shopping is still relatively novel, but early reports are not
promising. One study identifies two major types of shoppers on the Inter
7
net. 7 One type, the "convenience" shopper, has a particular purchase in
mind and rationally uses the Internet to reduce search costs, such as by us
ing a search engine to gather information on a product and compare prices
8
and by reading product reviews online. 7 The "recreational" shopper, on the
other hand, shops for the sheer enjoyment of the experience and, stimulated
79
by the interactive nature of the Internet, often purchases impulsively. Rec
reational shoppers "may be driven by need to purchase rather than need for
80
a product." Analysts report that recreation may be "more important than
1
convenience for online shoppers."8 Even shoppers who begin their shopping
experience rationally to reduce the costs of their transaction may ultimately
82
engage in impulse buying. The Internet environment apparently contributes
to impulse purchasing because of its anonymity (people purchasing impul
sively prefer privacy),

availability twenty-four hours a day,

and other

"recreational shopping features," such as "e-mail alerts of new products . . .
83
[and] special offers."
In short, the online environment may contribute to impulsivity and even
addictive purchasing among consumers. For consumers who succumb,
Internet shopping may consist in large part of "consumers who utilize inter
active features [to] enter a seamless sequence of responses, a ' flow' state in
which their sense of time and reality becomes distorted and their self
4
control is diminished."8 These findings "challenge [the] explanations of the
online shopping experience that emphasize economic convenience and the
operation of an efficient electronic marketplace . . . . [O]nline buying could
be out of control and . . . not . . . judged against rational standards of con
5
sumer efficiency."8
77. Junghyun Kim & Robert LaRose, Interactive £-Commerce: Promoting Consumer Effi
ciency or Impulsivity? 10 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Nov. 2004, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/
vol I O/issue l lkim_larose.html.
78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80. Id. (citing Dennis W. Rook & Robert J. Fisher, Normative Influences in Impulsive Buying
Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER REs., Dec. 1 995, at 305-13).
81.

Id.

82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84. Id. Reluctance to purchase because of fear of disclosing information diminishes when
firms have good reputations, when the consumer is familiar with a site, and even when sites have
"visually pleasing" layouts, including easy navigation and "professionalism." See Miriam J.
Metzger, Privacy, Trust, and Disclosure: Exploring Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 9 J. COM
PUTER-MEDIATED COMM., July 2004, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol9/issue4/metzger.html ("Web sites
of respected organizations that were visually pleasing were rated high in trustworthiness and exper
tise.").
85. Kim & LaRose, supra note 77; see also Robert LaRose & Matthew S. Eastin, Is Online
Buying Out of Control? Electronic Commerce and Consumer Self-Regulation, 46 J. BROADCASTING
& ELECTRONIC MEDIA 549, 559 (2002) ("[D]eficient self-regulation . . . . may be a more important
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On the other hand, some characteristics of online shopping may contrib
ute to shopping rationality. Convenient access to prices, search engines that
easily take consumers to competitors' sites, shopping carts, product reviews,
and the absence of a hands-on bonding experience with a product moderate
86
consumer impulsivity. In fact, business publications paint a rosy picture of
the Internet's empowerment of consumers who are "taking control of the
s
way [they] learn[] and hear[] about products." 7
More study is necessary before we can reach any conclusions about the
ultimate influence of the Internet on shopping behavior, but if the Internet
marketplace is comprised in large part of impulse purchasers or people who
tum into impulse purchasers, it is obviously not the kind of environment that
is conducive to reading and shopping for terms prior to a transaction. If con
sumers throw caution to the wind in the very decision to partake in a
transaction, this suggests only a small possibility that such consumers would
studiously read and shop for terms prior to the transaction. Ironically, the
very lack of time pressure that might be thought to increase reading may do
the opposite. Theorists of the Internet shopping process surmise that the lack
of time pressure ironically may increase impulse purchasing as consumers
ss
At the

get caught up in the enjoyment of surfing for unnecessary items.

least, additional time allows consumers more interaction with a site, which,
in tum, may enhance a consumer's favorable attitude toward and confidence
8
in the site. 9 Such beliefs may reduce the perceived need to read terms.
To this point, I have said nothing about the reality that people review
their standard forms on their screens instead of by reading hard copy. Will
this increase or decrease reading? Reading from the screen can be difficult
on the eyes, not to mention can create orthopedic emergencies.90 In short,
reading is probably not enhanced by the absence of hard copy. People can
print out terms, but from what has been said already about impatience and
the like, the likelihood seems small that people will take the time to do so.
In short, the lack of a hard copy probably contributes to consumers' lack of
reading of their standard forms.

determinant of online buying activity than either rational or economic expectations about the cost
and convenience of Internet shopping or the personal and economic characteristics of e-commerce
consumers.").
86. LaRose & Eastin, supra note 85, at 552; see also Robert LaRose, On the Negative Effects
of £-Commerce: A Sociocognitive Exploration of Unregulated On-Line Buying, 6 J. COMPUTER
MEDIATED COMM., Apr. 2001, http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol6/issue3/larose.html.
87. Paul Markillie, Crowned at Last, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 2, 2005, at 3, 4; see also Alan
Mitchell, Marketers Must Face Up to the Buyer's Side of the Coin, MKTG. WEEK, Apr. 14, 2005, at
32 (discussing how the Internet "turns the tables" on businesses). But see Victoria Murphy, The
Revolution That Wasn 't, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2003, at 2 10 (asserting that the anticipated benefits of
online shopping have failed to materialize).
88. Kim & LaRose, supra note 77 (citing Sharon E. Beatty & M. Elizabeth Ferrell, Impulse
Buying: Modeling Its Precursors, 74 J. RETAILING 169-9 1 (1998)).
89.

Metzger, supra note 84.

90.
For example, at the moment that I am typing this, I am experiencing pain in my shoulder
and neck from looking at this manuscript on the screen. This is likely bad for my tennis.
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2. Watchdog Groups
As discussed, mandatory website disclosure might create incentives for
businesses to write reasonable terms because watchdog groups can spread
the word about unreasonable terms. The problem is that although the fear of
watchdog groups may create incentives to avoid drafting outrageous terms
(that would be stricken today under unconscionability or related law any
way), this concern may be insufficient to deter businesses from drafting
marginal terms that may not create significant reputational concerns but
would harm consumers just the same. For example, a business that is wary

of watchdog groups may shy away from a term that requires a consumer to
reimburse the business's attorneys' fees and costs regardless of the outcome
91
but such terms may be

of a dispute or to arbitrate in a non-neutral setting,

unenforceable on unconscionability grounds anyway. On the other hand, a

firm may decide that the benefits of a forum-selection clause that is incon
venient for the consumer or a term allowing an Internet site to "collect[]

certain non-personally identifiable information about a consumer's web
92
surfing and computer usage," outweighs the costs of whatever bad press
they may produce. And, as I will discuss more fully below, such terms may
be enforceable if disclosed on a business's website because of the absence
of procedural unconscionability.
The efficacy of watchdog groups also depends on whether consumers and
news services access the groups' websites and whether visitors to these sites
publicize the information. This will depend in tum on the reputations of the
watchdogs, as well as the reliability and timeliness of their information. Cur
rently, apparently because of insufficient resources and questionable consumer
interest, many watchdog groups monitor only large software developers. The
success of watchdog groups has yet to be proven.

B. Legal Ramifications of Mandatory Website Disclosure When
Consumers Do Not Read and Shop
An ominous possibility is that mandatory website disclosure will back
fire and create a safe haven for businesses that are seeking to write marginal,
but not outrageous terms. Terms once potentially stricken on unconscion
ability or related grounds might be enforceable because of their reasonable
disclosure.
Most cases entertaining an unconscionability or related claim, including
those involving e-commerce, look for both procedural and substantive

9 1. See Kunz et al., supra note 65, at 280-81 ("[T]he terms most commonly providing the
impetus to challenge the validity of electronic standard-form agreements are dispute resolution
clauses, forum selection clauses, disclaimers of warranty, limitations of liability, and prohibitions on
the commercial use of the data or software available on the site." (footnotes omitted)).
92. Magid, supra note 3 1 (discussing the licensing agreement that accompanies Gain Pub
lishing's eWallet software, which authorizes the collection of data about a consumer's reading
behavior, TV interests, and communication partners, effectively allowing the company to "follow
[the transferee] around").
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Procedural unconscionability involves the manner in

which the contract was made and regulates situations resembling, among
other things, duress, misrepresentation, or, most important here, an unfair
94
Although contract law generally does not
95
evaluate the adequacy of an exchange,
substantive unconscionability
96
focuses on whether the exchange is grossly imbalanced. Many courts apply

presentation of the terms.

a sliding

scale

to

the

unconscionability inquiry whereby "the more

substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
9
unenforceable, and vice versa." 7
If courts rarely strike a contract or term based solely on one or the other
kind of unconscionability, but use a sliding scale of procedural and substan
tive unconscionability, what will be the outcome of mandatory website
disclosure? Perhaps marginal terms, insufficiently outlandish to motivate a
court to strike them on substantive unconscionability grounds alone, will be
enforceable because of their early disclosure on the website. For example,
consider the term mentioned earlier allowing a software vendor to "collect[]
certain non-personally identifiable information about [a consumer's] Web
9
surfing and computer usage." 8 If such authorization to "follow around" the
99
consumer is fully disclosed on the vendor's webpage, I doubt that a court
would strike it on substantive unconscionability grounds alone.
The result of mandatory website disclosure would constitute a legal
backfire. Mandatory website disclosure would narrow consumer rights
rather than expand them. Although the Critical Legal Studies movement
once claimed that laws seemingly designed to even the playing field are part
of a conspiracy of the elite to "justify the prevailing conditions of social life
00
and erect . . . barriers to social change," 1 the motive for adopting manda93. See, e.g. , Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 2 18 F. Supp. 2d 1 165, 1 172-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); In re
Rea!Networks, Inc., Privacy Litigation, No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000);
Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 9 18, 924 (N.D. 2005); Korobkin, supra note 13, at
1254 ("Courts usually search for 'substantive unconscionability' only when there is evidence of a
procedural defect in the bargaining process. Without evidence of 'procedural unconscionability,'
courts generally defer completely to seller-drafted terms."); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability
and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 1 15 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 ( 1967). But see Hill
man & Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 457 & n. 158 (citing some cases where procedural or substantive
unconscionability alone was enough).
94. See Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New
Frameworkfor U. C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42 ( 1981).
95.

Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 506 n.6 (2002).

96.

Leff, supra note 93, at 485-86.

97.

Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).

98. Magid, supra note 3 1 (quoting the licensing agreement that accompanies Gain Publish
ing's eWallet software).
99.

Id.

100. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Schol
ars: The Unfolding Drama ofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199, 209 ( 1984), quoted in
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF C ONTRACT LAW 201 ( 1997). For example, according to
Donald Kennedy (I know his name is Duncan, but he once called me Richard Hillman in print), "the
doctrine of unequal bargaining power represents a partial acceptance of distributive motives into the
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tory website disclosure would be benign. Still, lawmakers must understand
that their predictions about how people will respond to a law can miss the
mark and must realize that a disclosure strategy may inadvertently place
consumers in a worse position than the status quo and even forestall other
attempts at reform. 101
C ONCLUSION

Despite all that has been said, mandatory website disclosure may still be
the best strategy for dealing with the problem of e-standard forms. As men
02
tioned, other solutions present significant problems of their own. 1 Further,
mandatory website disclosure is cheap, substantiates the claim of consumer
assent, and constitutes a symbolic victory for those advocating greater fair
ness in e-standard-form contracting.
Of course, mandatory website disclosure is attractive for these reasons
only if my fear of a legal backfire proves exaggerated because the benefits
of disclosure outweigh the costs of the enforcement of some questionable
terms. And perhaps I am being unduly pessimistic about the possibility that
disclosure will backfire. After all, if disclosure were a good strategy for
businesses to avoid unconscionability claims and of little concern because
consumers do not read their standard forms, one would expect to see lots of
precontract disclosure of e-standard forms already. Businesses tempted to
draft unfair terms must therefore believe that disclosure benefits consumers.
But I am not convinced by this argument. Business decisionmakers may
themselves fail to make rational decisions for much the same reasons as
3
consumers. 10 For example, businesses may be unduly risk averse concerning

domain of contract law, but an acceptance that is rhetorical rather than real-intended to disarm."
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Ref
erence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 4 1 Mo. L. R E V. 563, 622 ( 1982),
quoted in HILLMAN, supra, at 204.
101. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buy
ers? Evidence from Software License Agreements (Aug. 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (noting that evidence suggests that "sellers whose boilerplate is more one-sided tend to
make their contract harder to challenge by requiring buyers to unequivocally accept it").
102.

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.

103. Although subject to debate, managers probably make cognitive errors, just like everyone
else. See, e.g., MAX B AZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKI NG 5 (4th ed. 1998)
("Since managers make hundreds of decisions daily, the systematic and time-consuming demands of
rational decision making are simply not viable."); Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 W M. & M ARY
L. R E V. 1907, 1 9 1 1 n.7 (2002) ("[T]he uncertainty and pressure from business competitors and rapid
technological change has led executives to enter into mega-mergers on the basis of the kind of deci
sion-making biases that, according to behavioral and psychological research, are typical of human
beings reacting in the face of complexity and uncertainty. People often make decisions from little
data, or from data that is exemplary, in the foreground or available, but that is not statistically repre
sentative." (quoting James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. R E V. 249, 288-89 (200 1))); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of
Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, IOI M I CH. L. R E V. 482, 561--62
(2002) ("[T]raditional economists argue that because in markets decisionmakers pay a price for their
mistakes they learn and correct their errors. The learning argument assumes, however, that deci
sionmakers are able to identify their mistakes, associate them with the costs they incur [sic] and
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the outcome of disclosure and therefore prefer to hide their marginal terms,
even though disclosing them actually would work to their advantage.
Ultimately, optimism about disclosure may depend on one's time frame
for measuring the law's effects. Even if disclosure backfires in the short
term, perhaps eventually the word will get out about a business's unsavory
terms. Consider the experience of cigarette manufacturers who, in response
to legislation, put warning labels on their packages. For a considerable pe
riod of time, these labels helped manufacturers " 'fend[] off smokers' suits' "
104
based on smokers' assumption of the risk.
As a result, " ' [ w ]hat was in
1 5
tended as a burden on tobacco became a shield instead.' " 0 In the long run,
however, the package warnings, along with the many revelations about ciga
rette manufacturers' attempts to hide other adverse facts about their
products, led to a massive change in public opinion and, ultimately, to seri
06
ous legal sanctions against the cigarette companies. 1 Perhaps mandatory
website disclosure will also have a long-term beneficial effect.

proceed to correct them. These assumptions are rarely met either in the case of entry or in other
legally significant real-world settings." (footnote omitted)). For a general discussion of the fallibility
of corporate cultures, see Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 4 17
(2003).
104. Cain et al. , supra note 73, at 3 n.2 (quoting Action on Smoking and Health, Warning:
History of Tobacco Manipulation of Congress (Sept. 1 1, 1997), http://www. no-smoking.org/sept97/
9- 11-97-1.html).
105.
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106. For a discussion of public opinion's influence on lawmaking, see Robert A. Hillman, The
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( 1999).

